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Abstract 
This paper reviews peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, its development in the UK and other countries, 
and assesses the business and economic policy issues surrounding this new form of 
intermediation. P2P platform technology allows direct matching of borrowers’ and lenders’ 
diversification over a large number of borrowers without the loans having to be held on an 
intermediary balance sheet. P2P lending has developed rapidly in both the US and the UK, but 
it still represents a small fraction, less than 1%, of the stock of bank lending. In the UK – but 
not elsewhere – it is an important source of loans for smaller companies. We argue that P2P 
lending is fundamentally complementary to, and not competitive with, conventional banking. 
We therefore expect banks to adapt to the emergence of P2P lending, either by cooperating 
closely with third-party P2P lending platforms or offering their own proprietary platforms. 
We also argue that the full development of the sector requires much further work addressing 
the risks and business and regulatory issues in P2P lending, including risk communication, 
orderly resolution of platform failure, control of liquidity risks and minimisation of fraud, 
security and operational risks. This will depend on developing reliable business processes, the 
promotion to the full extent possible of transparency and standardisation and appropriate 
regulation that serves the needs of customers.  
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1. Introduction 
A wide range of ‘peer-to-peer’ (P2P) financial platforms have emerged in the recent years, 
supporting personal loans (Zopa, Prosper, Lending Club), small business lending (First Circle, 
Kabbage), invoice discounting (The Receivables Exchange, Market Invoice) and foreign 
exchange transactions (Currency Cloud, Currency Fair, Transferwise). The volume of these 
activities has grown rapidly from a relatively low base. For example P2P lending in the UK 
has doubled every year in the past four years with the stock of loans exceeding £1 billion in 
2014 and £2 billion in 2015 (Peer-to-Peer Finance Assocation, 2015d). Incumbent financial 
institutions are paying attention, investigating the possibility of developing their own ‘in 
house’ P2P platforms (Jenkins & Alloway, 2015).  
Much commentary has focused on the possibility that the development of these new P2P 
platforms will overturn the existing organisational and institutional structure of banking. 
Much has already occurred, for example, in recorded music distribution, in telephony or in air 
and travel reservations (King, 2010). The perception that P2P lending can ‘reinvent’ the bank 
has prompted ambitious projections of P2P lending growth over the next five-to-ten years 
(with suggestions that the stock of lending taken from banks by P2P platforms could be as 
high as $1 trillion dollars globally). This is not, however, the only possible outcome. Different 
business models may co-exist – as for example in booking of holiday rooms, where Airbnb 
supports a C2C (consumer-to-consumer) exchange as an alternative to more traditional B2C 
(business-to-consumer) provision; or instead incumbents may adapt their business models to 
the new technology as has already happened in personal and household insurance markets 
and household utility services, such as gas and electricity.  
This report has been prepared with two principal objectives. First to provide an overview of 
P2P lending, explaining what it is and comparing it with other forms of P2P finance (section 
2) and documenting its development in the UK and other countries (section 3). Our second 
objective (pursued in section 4) is to assess the business model and the economics of P2P 
unsecured personal lending.  
As we discuss in section 2, P2P platforms offer major competitive advantages over established 
banks in bringing together lenders and borrowers. These advantages include: extremely low 
interest margins because of their low administrative costs and because the platforms do not 
themselves assume any risk exposure; the ability to offer loans to some customers who may 
be turned down for loans by established banks; and their innovative use of technology to 
provide much greater transparency, flexibility and rapid and a more convenient service for 
customers.  
Nevertheless, we urge caution about the prospects of P2P supplanting conventional banking. 
As we show in section 3, the amount P2P lending remains very small relative to conventional 
bank lending, even in those jurisdictions such as the US and the UK where P2P lending has 
developed the most rapidly. Our analysis in section 4 of the business models and economics 
of P2P lending suggests that rather than disrupting banking, P2P lending is best viewed as 
complementary to conventional bank business models, allowing banks to economise on risk 
capital and concentrate on the provision of liquidity services, which are the fundamental core 
of their business models. For this reason we expect that banks will either cooperate closely 
with third party P2P lending platforms (this is already happening in the US) or offer their own 
proprietary platforms, in order to provide both loan and investment services to their 
customers. We also argue that while there is scope eventually for a substantial proportion of 
lending to be provided through P2P platforms, and this could lead to large gains, both private 
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and social, the full development of the sector requires much further work to address the risks 
and the business and regulatory issues in P2P lending. We argue that much greater 
standardisation of loan, credit performance and operational metrics will be key to supporting 
effective P2P lending. 
Similar challenges of standardisation arise in many other areas of banking and other financial 
services, where new financial technologies hold out the promise of reducing costs and risks 
and improving the value for money and quality of service to customers. Incumbent institutions 
may resist standardisation, and it can therefore be argued that regulatory and public policy 
intervention will be needed to ensure that the full potential of financial innovation is achieved. 
In short the extent to which P2P lending platforms are successful in capturing credit activity 
depends largely on meeting the challenges of amending and adapting existing business 
processes, including the adoption of industry-wide standards, in order to support this new 
form of intermediation and only to a much more limited extent on exploiting technological 
innovation. As in many other areas of financial technology, the issues are as much as 80% 
business process and as little as 20% technological. Current speculation about the growth of 
P2P lending is simply that and nothing more. Everything depends on the strategies of new 
entrants and their implementation and on the response of both incumbents and public 
authorities and their willingness to cooperate on the development of the sector. It is simply 
too early to make any reliable judgements on how large P2P lending will become in a few 
years from now.  
2. Peer-to-peer in finance 
This section provides an overview of the development of peer-to-peer finance with a focus on 
peer-to-peer lending. 
2.1 The origins of peer-to-peer 
The term ‘peer-to-peer’ describes the interaction between two parties without the need for a 
central intermediary. The term originated in the field of computer networking, to describe a 
network where any one computer can act as either a client or a server to other computers on 
the network without having to connect to a centralised server. The internet is itself a P2P 
network. 
The growth of the internet and its ability to facilitate disintermediation between users has 
given rise to a range of more specific P2P activities. The first such activity to become widely 
adopted (around the turn of the millennium) was peer-to-peer file sharing, where users could, 
by installing the necessary software on their computers, connect directly to other users on the 
network who had similar software, in order to share files such as photos, music, movies and 
games. 
The widespread adoption of P2P file sharing, through services such as Napster, Gnutella, 
Kazaa, LimeWire and more recently BitTorrent, has had a massive impact on the music and 
film industries, particularly on the sales of physical products such as CDs and DVDs (although 
ultimately delivery has moved away from P2P models to streaming services such as Spotify 
or NetFlix). Whether the overall impact on these industries has been positive or negative is 
open to debate and depends on one’s point of view, but these industries have been 
fundamentally transformed since Napster first appeared in 1999, as noted by Grassmuck 
(2010): 
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What has clearly emerged is that there are a number of different dynamics at work, 
yielding a mixed result with respect to album sales, a likely positive result for the 
music industry as a whole through gains in concert and merchandising revenues, and 
a clearly positive effect on social welfare through improved market chances for non-
star music, greater cultural diversity and increased consumer surplus. 
One question addressed in this paper is whether the financial services industry could see 
equally fundamental shifts from the adoption of P2P lending. 
2.2 The history of peer-to-peer finance 
The history of P2P in finance can be traced back to the launch of two companies, the UK-based 
Zopa in 2005 and the US-based Prosper in 2006. Both facilitated peer-to-peer lending, whereby 
borrowers and lenders could bypass banks and deal directly with each other through a central 
marketplace. Chris Larsen, co-Founder of Prosper, described his company’s offering as an 
“eBay for Credit” (Business Wire, 2006). 
To date, Prosper claims more than 2 million members and total lending of $6 billion of lending 
(Prosper, 2016). Zopa reports that it has supported a cumulative total of £1.4 billion of P2P 
loans and that it currently has some 53,000 investors lending to its 114,000 borrowers (Zopa, 
2016a). In the years since Zopa and Prosper were first launched, a number of other companies 
have successfully launched their own marketplaces. For example, in the UK there are now 
eight members of the Peer2Peer Finance Association (see the following section 3 for a more 
detailed description of developments in the UK and other countries). 
There has also been an expansion of several other novel alternative financial services operating 
outside of conventional banking and capital markets. These include: i) crowdfunding, which 
is where a sum of money is raised for a specific project (the funding) by lots of smaller 
contributions from individuals (the crowd). At the time of writing, some 39 UK crowdfunding 
platforms were members of the UK Crowd Funding Association (see UK Crowd Funding 
Association, 2016); ii) alternative foreign exchange platforms, where individuals and 
businesses exchange foreign currencies without using banks; iii) non-bank invoice 
discounting, where small firms can improve their cash flow by securing advances from 
investors against invoices due; and iv) cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and LiteCoin, which 
support instant, online payments in digital currencies without any central issuer.  
A number of these other alternative forms of finance also have ‘peer-to-peer’ features. The 
independence of financial institutions, governments and central banks is a defining feature of 
cryptocurrencies (but also a limitation because to date they exchange only on relatively limited 
networks). Crowdfunding is also P2P by design. Other forms of alternative finance can be P2P. 
MarketInvoice, the leading UK invoice discounting firm is a member of the Peer-to-Peer 
Finance Association and offers a P2P platform for invoice finance. As they emphasise on their 
webpages, however, their P2P platform is not open to retail investors.  
Non-bank foreign exchange services such as Transferwise, CurrencyFair and CurrencyCloud 
are often described as “peer-to-peer” but this is not always accurate. CurrencyFair offers an 
internal platform where clients can transact with each other – P2P – at current ‘mid-market 
rates’ (the average of buying and selling rates offered by the major international foreign 
exchange dealers). CurrencyCloud also offers direct exchange at mid-market rates between 
customers, but this is for business clients (larger corporate and financial institutions), not retail 
customers or small businesses. Transferwise is not really a P2P service at all. Instead, all 
customers exchange with Transferwise for a fixed fee at an exchange rate set at the time of the 
transaction. It is able to do this for a relatively low fee because the large majority of their 
transactions net out internally – e.g. exchanges from euro to sterling matched by exchanges 
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from sterling to euro. Transferwise then uses CurrencyCloud to exchange any final net 
imbalances from its customer orders (see Käärman, 2016). 
It is questionable whether the ‘peer-to-peer’ nature of P2P lending is important, in the same 
way that it is in platforms such as Airbnb or Uber. The diversification of loans means that there 
is never a personal relationship between borrower and lender in the same way that is created 
by an Airbnb booking. Ratings of borrowers and lenders are not an important quality- control 
mechanism as they are for example on EBay. While some individual P2P lending platforms 
may promote their personal or community orientation, this is not a fundamental feature of the 
business model.  
2.3 The competitive advantages of peer-to-peer lending platforms 
The rapid growth of P2P lending platforms, doubling their business annually in recent years, 
and their perceived cost and other advantages relative to established banks, have led a number 
of commentators to make quite ambitious projections about the extent to which P2P lending 
can capture market share in banking lending markets.1 There are several reasons for expecting 
continued rapid growth of P2P lending. The exploitation of new technology, e.g. the fact that 
the Internet can facilitate disintermediation by allowing parties to communicate directly with 
one another, is of course a fundamental reason. But the potential for growth is also because of 
a number of competitive advantages of P2P lending platforms over the incumbent suppliers, 
i.e. the banks.  
These advantages can be grouped into four categories: i) offering better rates of return than 
are available on bank deposits together with relatively low fees for borrowers; ii) provision of 
credit to some categories of borrowers unable to access bank lending; iii) a perception that P2P 
lending is more responsible and of greater social value than conventional banking; and finally 
iv) technical innovation improving the quality and speed of service to both borrowers and 
lenders. 
Lenders on P2P platforms have over the past five years have achieved substantially better 
returns than could have been obtained from investing their money in conventional bank 
savings deposits. This is in part because of the cost advantages of P2P platforms compared to 
traditional banks. The focused nature of their activities ensures that the administrative and 
overhead costs required for setting up a P2P platform are relatively low. Platforms are also 
able to match borrowers and lenders (because they are not holding any of the loans 
themselves) without any interest margin. While lenders on P2P lenders are exposed to greater 
risk (there is no deposit insurance and no promise of returns), these risks have at least to date 
been substantially compensated by much higher rates of return.  
A second reason for the growth of P2P lending has been that they provide greater access to 
credit. Since the onset of the global financial crisis, banks and traditional lenders have been 
more reluctant to provide credit to borrowers. Some individuals and small businesses that do 
not satisfy the more stringent criteria that banks now place on granting loans can, through 
peer-to-peer lending services, find alternative lenders who are willing to take on the risk of 
providing such loans or to offer them at lower rates of interest. 
                                                     
1 Three reports from 2015 are relevant in this context: PWC (2015a) projects that P2P lending could grow 
by 2025 to capture 10% of the $800 billion US market for revolving consumer debt and 4% of the $1.4 
trillion of non-revolving consumer debt held by US financial institutions; Moldow (2015) projects global 
P2P lending to rise to $1 trillion by 2025, on the assumption that it captures 10% of consumer and other 
lending markets; and Morgan Stanley Research (2015) projects that P2P lending will capture 10% of US 
lending by 2020 and reach a stock of $150-$490 billion globally.  
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Another factor in the initial growth of P2P lending is the perception that – by directly linking 
individual borrowers and lenders – it offers a more socially beneficial form of finance, without 
the concerns sometimes levelled at banks and other conventional financial intermediaries that 
they exploit their market power and pursue profit without adequate regard to the interests of 
their own customers. This perception, however, has been somewhat eroded by the increasing 
presence of institutional investors as lenders on P2P lending platforms.  
The final advantage of P2P lending is technological. Banks spend a great deal of money on 
technology, but the majority of that goes towards maintaining existing systems, rather than on 
innovating new ones. According to a report published by research and consulting firm Celent 
in January 2012, banks planned to spend 77.6% of their 2012 technology budgets on 
maintenance (Celent, 2012) . Banks – particularly retail banks – tend to have large, legacy 
systems that are difficult to replace because of the infrastructure that has been built around 
them.  
Start-up firms – P2P lenders but also ‘challenger banks’ seeking to compete with established 
banks in a fuller range of banking services using new technologies – can design and implement 
operational systems that take advantage of the latest Web 2.0 technologies, without being 
hindered by the need for continuity with older legacy systems. This in turn can allow them to 
offer better quality service both to borrowers (a simple loan application process with a rapid 
decision and a transparent and flexible portal for monitoring their repayments and 
outstanding commitments) and lenders (for managing their lending and tracking the current 
status of their investments). 
In addition, modern technology allows P2P intermediaries to provide new approaches to 
intermediation not available with traditional bank business models. Thus, to take a UK 
example, the minimum investment in the P2P lender FirstCircle of £100 is spread over more 
than 100 borrowers with a maximum of 1% exposure to each. The investor can see all the 
available information such as credit rating, location and business sector on each business they 
invest in. 
While all P2P lending platforms employ similar methods of diversification, they have used 
technology to pursue two different approaches to matching lenders and borrowers. One is an 
online auction approach in which borrowers indicate the maximum interest rate they are 
willing to pay on their loans and lenders indicate the minimum rate they are looking to obtain 
for specified categories of risk. As new borrowers come onto the platform, they are matched 
with bidders looking to provide loans on the platform. The platform then conducts an 
automatic ‘reverse auction’, gradually increasing the interest rate payable on the loan until 
there are sufficient bids to fully fund the loan (subject to the diversification requirement 
limiting the magnitude of individual loan exposures). Provided this interest rate is at or below 
the maximum rate the borrower is willing to pay, then the loan is funded at this interest rate. 
If not, it is then rejected.  
Another approach – somewhat easier for borrowers and lenders to understand – is an 
automatic matching of borrowers and lenders at announced market rates of interest set by the 
platform for each risk category. This can mean delays in matching – since there are typically 
imbalances with more borrowers than lenders or more lenders than borrowers – but the 
platform can adjust interest rates over time to eliminate these imbalances.  
3. The recent growth of P2P lending 
This section provides a detailed review of the UK P2P lending market and some comparisons 
with P2P in other jurisdictions – the US, China and the rest of the EU. We highlight the 
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relatively limited share of total lending that the markets have achieved to date, despite rapid 
growth, the wide range of different business models and the major differences in economic 
and regulatory institutions that have resulted in substantially different development paths of 
P2P lending platforms in different jurisdictions. 
3.1 The United Kingdom 
P2P lending has grown rapidly in the UK. It now makes an important contribution (13% in 
2015) of the supply of new loans to small enterprises (those with turnover of £1 million or less). 
There is also a large and growing volume of P2P unsecured consumer lending, but this still 
accounts for only a small share of the total UK market for unsecured consumer loans. 
Figure 1. The £3.2 billion alternative finance market in the UK, 2015 (£ million) 
 
Source: Authors’ configuration based on data on the end-year stock of financing from Zhang et al. 
(2016a). 
Figure 1 shows a breakdown of this alternative finance. P2P consumer lending is the largest 
category, followed by P2P business lending and P2P real estate lending (primarily for buy-to-
let residential mortgages).  
This is part of the larger alternative finance market reported in Zhang et al. (2016). They find 
total funding of £3.2 billion raised in the UK ‘alternative finance’ market during 2015 of, of 
which £2.4 billion of gross lending was attributable to peer-to-peer lending (debt finance in 
which the platform or intermediary takes on no risk or open positions).  
Figure 2 shows 2015 growth rates of the principal segments of UK alternative finance reported 
by Zhang et al. (2016). Comparing the gross provision of funding in 2015 over the previous 
year, the fastest growth was in equity crowd funding which grew by nearly 400% (following 
similarly rapid growth in 2104 compared to 2013). P2P business lending was the second-largest 
growth area of 2014. P2P consumer lending and invoice trading grew more slowly but still 
more than doubled in 2015 compared to 2014.  
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Figure 2. Annual growth rates of UK alternative finance, 2015 on 2014 
 
Source: Authors’ configuration based on data from Zhang et al. (2016). Figures for Equity crowd funding 
and P2P Business Lending combine real-estate lending and non-real estate business lending. 
 
The series of reports on alternative finance from NESTA and the Cambridge Centre for 
Alternative Finance provide a wealth of further details about alternative finance and P2P 
lending in the UK. They document, for example, participation both by gender and by region. 
Baeck et al. (2014) report that in 2014 the average size of a P2P business loan was £73,222 and 
these loans were sourced from an average of 796 investors. In the same period the average P2P 
consumer loan was £5,471. The median investment by P2P lenders was in excess of £5,000. 
Some 46% of P2P consumer loans in the UK in 2014 were used to purchase a vehicle.  
(Zhang et al., 2016) report a growing share of investment in UK P2P lending platforms from 
institutional investors. They report that in 2015 institutional investment accounted for 32% of 
gross lending in peer-to-peer consumer lending, 26% of peer-to-peer business loans and 25% 
in peer-to-peer lending secured on real estate, with all these proportions rising steadily 
through the year; i.e. by end year about one-third of all P2P lending in the UK was from 
institutional investors (see their Figure 18, p. 29). They also provide information on a wide 
range of other forms of alternative finance (community shares, reward-based crowdfunding, 
pension-led funding, donation-based crowdfunding, debt-based securities together providing 
only a little over £100 million of finance in 2015, but growing fast from their low initial base). 
There are eight established P2P lending platforms in the UK, all members of the UK Peer-to-
Peer Finance Association, which states on its website that it represents over 90% of the UK 
peer-to-peer and invoice trading market.2 Their business models vary considerably, as 
illustrated by the sums on their net lending flows to different categories of borrowers in Table 
1 below.  
Zopa – launched in 2005 as the first peer-to-peer lending platform in the world – offers only 
unsecured consumer lending (including small sole-proprietor businesses). The smaller 
platform LendingWorks also supports only unsecured consumer lending. Funding Circle – 
launched in 2010 and now by a small margin the largest UK P2P platform– is not involved in 
                                                     
2 For more information on P2PFA, see http://p2pfa.info/ 
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consumer lending at all, supporting instead only unsecured lending to small business and 
lending secured on residential property. The smaller platform ThinCats also supports 
unsecured business lending and lending secured on residential property. Two other platforms 
– LendInvest and Landbay – support only lending secured on property. RateSetter is the only 
platform supporting lending to all three categories of lending – unsecured consumer, 
unsecured small business and real estate lending. 
Table 1. P2P lending volumes by platform and compared with other credit markets in the UK 
 Balance Net Lending Flow, 2015 (£mn) Number of: 
 Platform End-
2015 
(£mn) 
Consumer SME Secured on 
Property 
(mainly buy-
to-let) 
Total Lenders 
‘000 
Borrowers 
‘000 
Funding Circle 657 - 243 89 332 42.9 15.4 
Zopa 625 293 - - 293 53.0 113.6 
RateSetter 517 154 68 24 245 26.5 138.5 
Lendinvest 195 - - 108 108 2.2 1.0 
Thincats 89 - 21 6 27 1.8 0.3 
Market Invoice 36 Annual lending of £264mn to businesses 0.2 1.6 
Landbay 21 - - 19 19 0.8 0.1 
LendingWorks 14 10 - - 10 1.1 2.9 
Total P2P 2,155 456 332 246 1,033 128.3 273.6 
All lenders 522,620     14,606 2,294 6,784 21,380     
P2P (% of total) 0.4% 3.0% 12.6% 3.6% 4.8%     
Notes. All P2P data were calculated from tables in the press releases of the UK Peer-to-Peer Finance Association  
(2016b, 2015c, 2015b and 2015a). The data on other lenders are from the Bank of England: BankStats Table 5.2 for 
stock and flow of consumer credit from monetary financial institutions (banks and building societies); BankStats 
Table A8.1 for the stock and flow of lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by monetary financial 
institutions. Lending secured on property is calculated using Bank of England MLAR Table 1.33 to compute stock 
and flow for buy-to-let residential mortgage lending only and deducting P2P (we restrict comparison in this way 
because most UK P2P lending secured on property goes into the buy-to-let market, itself about 15% of total UK 
stock and flow of residential mortgage lending). The figures given here on lending flows are net of repayments and 
so are not directly comparable with the gross lending figures reported by Zhang et al., (2016) and illustrated in 
Figure 1.  
 
These seven platforms all provide a simple and easy-to-understand portal for retail investors 
(we describe three of these in more detail below). The eighth member of the Peer-to-Peer 
Finance Association, Market Invoice, has yet another business model, entirely different from 
any of the other seven. It provides business lending secured on invoices (note there are a 
number of other invoice-lending finance companies in the UK that are not members of the P2P 
Finance Association. Also, as Market Invoice makes clear on its website, they do not accept 
investment from retail lenders – instead all their investment comes from a variety of 
sophisticated, i.e. institutional, investors who are expected to understand fully the risks of this 
form of lending. 
There are a number of other UK P2P platforms that are not, as yet, members of the P2P Finance 
Association. Interest has been encouraged by a government decision that from April 2016 UK 
savers will be able to include money placed into P2P lending as part of their allowance for 
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investments in ‘ISAs’ (tax-exempt savings vehicles). The UK regulator, the Financial Conduct 
Authority, reports that in the UK: 
As at 30 March 2016, eight firms have been fully authorised to operate P2P platforms. 
There are a further 86 firms awaiting a decision, of which 44 have interim permission. 
Firms with interim permission were previously licensed by the Office of Fair Trading, 
which regulated consumer credit before the FCA, and are able to continue carrying out 
consumer credit activities until we decide whether to fully authorise them. Only P2P 
loans on platforms operated by firms with full authorisation will be eligible 
investments for the Innovative Finance ISA. 
We have conducted a brief web search, uncovering a few of these other firms. At the end of 
March 2016, SavingsStream (https://savingstream.co.uk) reported £121 million of P2P 
lending in bridging loans for property development. Verus360 (www.verus360.com ) supports 
P2P lines of credit (overdrafts). Their website does not report any figures on their total lending. 
According to their website, Wellesley and Co (www.wellesley.co.uk) has loaned (by end 
March 2016) some £310 million to business customers investing in property. Assetz Capital 
(www.assetzcapital.co.uk) supports lending to SME businesses, property developers and buy-
for-let lending, reporting cumulative lending to March 2016 of £80 million Proplend is a 
smaller platform supporting loans on commercial and residential property 
(www.proplend.com ) with loans at end March of £11 million. FolktoFolk 
(www.folk2folk.com) provides business loans secured on property, with a focus on local 
communities. They say they have loaned to date some £90 million without any defaults. 
PlatformBlack (www.platformblack.com/) is an invoice trading company with an online 
presence, which reports having supported to date some £124 million of invoice financing. 
Some of these platforms – for example Wellesley – invest their own money in the loans they 
support, along with the money of platform lenders. 
Table 1 (final rows) compares total P2P lending, using the data from the Peer-to-Peer Finance 
Association, with the total amount of credit provided by other providers of loan finance the 
UK. Such comparisons are not entirely straightforward. There are at least three different 
possible measures of market size – the end-period stock of loans outstanding, the gross 
amount of lending during the period before loan repayment and the net amount of lending 
after deducting loan repayments. Each can yield different outcomes for the market share of 
P2P lending. Another problem is comparing ‘like with like’ – there are several different sub-
markets for lending, including consumers of different credit standing and businesses of 
different size and credit worthiness; and also different types of loan product. Some – such as 
lending secured on property, is paid back relatively slowly with principal outstanding for 
several years; others such as unsecured consumer lending are paid back over shorter periods 
often between two and five years; yet other products are flexible lines of credit, e.g. overdraft 
facilities which are usually comparatively expensive, but drawn down for short periods and 
repaid relatively quickly. Calculations of market share can vary substantially depending on 
which measures are used. 
Our figures (Table 1, bottom row of column 2) indicate that on a stock basis P2P at end 2015 
was less than one-half of 1% of the total stock of UK lending of more than £500 billion in the 
loan markets where P2P platforms are active. We have not been able to find a breakdown of 
the total stock of P2P lending into the three main submarkets (consumer, SME and secured on 
property) Assuming this breakdown is in proportion to the share of net flows in our Table 1, 
then we find that P2P accounts for 0.53% of total unsecured consumer lending in the UK while 
P2P SME lending is 0.45% of total SME lending in the UK.  
It is more difficult to obtain reliable figures for the share of P2P in UK lending secured on 
property. Even making allowance for P2P lenders that are not members of the P2P Finance 
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Association, the stock of P2P lending secured on property is only around 0.05% of the total 
£1.5 trillion stock of UK on property, including owner-occupied, buy to let and commercial 
property.3 This percentage, however, is clearly too low since P2P lenders compete only in the 
sub-markets for buy to let and smaller commercial and residential property developments. UK 
regulations do not currently allow P2P loans for purchase of an owner-occupied dwelling (the 
primary residence of the borrower) at all. Larger commercial properties are too ‘lumpy’ to be 
able to exploit the diversification of risk needed for P2P lending to operate.  
For this reason our figures for total lending on property in Table 1 (both on stock and a net 
flow basis) are for buy to let lending only, excluding lending secured on other forms of 
property. The resulting percentage (0.29%) is closer to that we obtain for consumer and SME 
lending, although still a rather arbitrary number and probably an overestimate since it 
excludes lending to property developers.  
The shares of both small business and consumer P2P platforms in flows of UK lending are 
higher than these stock shares (either on a gross basis before repayments or on a net basis after 
deducting repayments). Zhang et al. (2016) report gross 2015 P2P consumer lending in the UK 
of £909 million, which works out at 1.4% of the £69.9 billion of total gross unsecured consumer 
lending in the UK.4 Our Table 1, column 3, making the same comparison on a net flow basis, 
reports a higher share of 3%. The gross calculation, however, is probably the more accurate 
representation of the market share captured by P2P. (The gross percentage is artificially 
boosted by comparatively low repayments of P2P consumer lending in 2015 based on lower 
volumes of P2P gross lending in earlier years; we report this figure because the P2P Finance 
Association reports a breakdown by customer group for net and not gross lending.) 
The share of UK P2P in smaller business lending is rather harder to pin down than that for 
unsecured consumer loans, because of the wide variety of different business borrowers. 
Looking at the broadest possible definition of the market, including lending secured on 
property and invoice financing yields slightly higher estimates of the P2P share of small 
business lending compared to that for unsecured consumer lending. Zhang et al. (2016) make 
this comparison on a gross basis, reporting that total P2P debt finance in 2015 for smaller 
business (lending secured on property, invoice financing and debt securities) was £1.8 billion 
and amounted to 3.43% of the total £53 billion of gross lending to SMEs reported by the Bank 
of England for 2014. We note, however, that total 2015 gross lending to SMEs by all monetary 
institutions (excluding overdrafts) has since been published as £57.9 billion, reducing this 
percentage to 3.1%.5  
The market share of P2P lending is considerably higher, however, when looking at unsecured 
loans to the smallest companies, i.e. excluding invoice financing and loans secured on 
property. Our Table 1 reports that P2P lenders were responsible for 12.4% of this market 
(lending to small- and medium-sized businesses) on a net flow basis, even when excluding 
invoice finance and debt securities. This is a somewhat uncertain figure since, in recent years 
since the global financial crisis, smaller businesses in the UK have been repaying lending to 
banks faster than they have been accessing new lending, i.e. the total net lending flow has been 
negative. 2015 was the first year in which the aggregate net lending flow has turned positive 
                                                     
3 Bank of England BankStats Table 5.3 reports end-2015 lending secured on residential property of £1.28 
trillion. The De Montfort University reports on commercial property lending estimate a stock of lending 
secured on commercial property of over £0.25 trillion. 
4 Data series LPQB4TX from the Bank of England interactive database. 
5 Bank of England figure from BankStats Table 8.2, which includes all business lending, including for 
property development and property investment. 
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and net flows may well in subsequent years grow substantially (hence reducing the share of 
P2P lending platforms in net lending flows). 
A similarly high and probably more reliable figure for the share of P2P lending in small 
business lending is reported by Zhang et al. (2016) , p. 19. They find that gross P2P platform 
lending to SMEs (£881 million excluding invoice finance and debt securities) was 12% of total 
new loans to the smallest companies (those with turnover of less than £1-2 million, the precise 
threshold varying from one reporting bank to another) as reported in the quarterly survey 
conducted by the British Bankers Association (BBA) of lending to smaller- and medium-sized 
business. The most recent BBA survey (British Bankers Association, 2016), published since 
Zhang et al. (2016) , indicates total new lending to smaller companies in 2015 of £6.7 billion; so 
this figure can be updated to 2015 (£881 million/£6.7 billion) to the slightly higher 13.1%. 
We now provide some further description of the three largest P2P lending platforms in the 
UK. 
Zopa (www.zopa.com) 
The first online service that brought together individual savers and borrowers was Zopa.com, 
launched in the UK in February 2005 as a marketplace for peer-to-peer lending. Zopa uses 
credit scores provided by the credit bureau Equifax (and also sometimes additionally 
information from CallCredit) to allocate borrowers into one of six ‘marketplaces’ (A*, A, B, C, 
D or E). The borrowers are individuals and very small businesses (sole traders). Borrowers 
obtain loans with repayment of interest and principal over periods of between one and five 
years. 
On average borrowers in the A* and A categories have incomes well above the national 
average and strong credit ratings. B and C borrowers have incomes closer to the national 
average and clean credit histories. D and E borrowers have incomes close to the national 
average and chequered credit histories. The following table shows Zopa’s calculations for 
expected annual default rates and projected annual net return within these six different 
markets. 
Table 2. Projected default and return for Zopa investments, March 2016 
% A* A B C D E 
Expected annual default in 
current economic environment 
0.0-1.0 0.5-2.5 2.5-4 4.5-6.5 9-11 10-12 
Projected annual return after 
expected defaults 
2-4 2-5.5 4-6 5-7 7-9 10-14 
Data source: www.zopa.com (March 2016). 
The mechanism for lending on the Zopa platform is described by the ‘Zopa principles’ on their 
webpages (Zopa, 2016b). The underlying mechanism, used by institutional investors, is as 
follows. Lenders decide how much to lend and their lending criteria (“the amount you wish 
to lend, the markets in which you wish to lend, the rate you are prepared to lend at and the 
period over which you are prepared to lend”). The loan is allocated randomly and amongst 
borrowers queued in the chosen ‘markets’. The interest rate paid by borrowers is determined 
at a level to match the amount of investment with the amount of borrowing sought in each of 
these markets. The default setting on the platform is automatic lending, meaning that the 
interest and principal repaid by borrowers are automatically loaned again to new borrowers 
in the nominated markets. 
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Zopa charges a servicing fee that is paid monthly by the borrower, before the payment of 
interest and principal to lenders. With this fee, as described on its website, “Zopa maintains a 
safeguard fund to protect its lenders against borrowers who default (fail to repay their loans). 
Additionally a small proportion of the fee is an admin fee that is paid to Zopa.” Contributions 
to the safeguard fund are based on average expected defaults according to Zopa’s own risk 
models, with the aim of maintaining the fund at a minimum of 110% of projected annual 
defaults (currently, in March 2016, the fund is reported to be 120% of projected annual 
defaults).  
Retail investors, who provide the majority of investment on Zopa, are presented with a 
simplified version of the mechanism used by institutional investors, their choice of a broad 
investment product determining their lending criteria. Since March of 2016, Zopa has offered 
three different retail investment products, each providing different risk exposure and 
projected returns: Zopa Access, Zopa Classic and Zopa Plus. Access and Classic are limited to 
loans in marketplaces A*- C and are protected by the Safeguard fund. Plus also allows 
investment in categories A* - E and there is no protection from the Safeguard fund.  
In Zopa, as in all other UK P2P lending platforms, the lending is a legal contract between 
lenders and borrowers. The platform is not itself exposed to borrower credit risk. Also, in 
contrast to a conventional bank deposit, the Zopa loan account does not allow investment to 
be withdrawn on demand or at the end of a fixed term. Zopa lenders can withdraw, however, 
either by taking back interest and principal, as these are repaid (by turning off the default 
automatic relending option), or by selling their existing loans on the platform to other lenders 
(paying a 1% fee with the Zopa Classi and Zopa Plus products or without a fee with Zopa 
Access).  
Zopa’s annual balance sheet and income and expenditure accounts can be found via UK 
Companies House (company number 05197592, documents currently available via 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/). These reveal accounting losses of £1.4 million in 2011, 
£1.8 million in 2012, £2.6 million in 2013 and £5.6 million in 2014. These are relatively large in 
comparison to the amount of lending supported by the platform; for example, the 2014 loss is 
around 2% of the average stock of lending supported on the platform during the course of that 
year. Section 4 discusses the significance of these continuing losses for the Zopa business 
model. 
Funding Circle (www.fundingcircle.com)  
Funding Circle was the first UK-based P2P lending service to focus on business funding, i.e. 
where savers lend directly to small businesses through an online marketplace. Since its launch 
in August 2010, it has expanded internationally to offer similar lending platforms in the US, 
the Netherlands, Spain and Germany as well as in the UK. 
Similar to other P2P lending marketplaces, Funding Circle uses a many-to-many approach, 
whereby lenders set their amount and interest rate, borrowers set the amount they want to 
borrow, and the online auction process determines how those amounts are distributed 
between borrowers and lenders. 
Borrowers are credit-checked through Experian and categorised into one of six risk bands (A+, 
A, B, C, D or E). Lenders pay a one-off fee that varies with risk band and is added to the loan 
amount. This varies from 2% for shorter maturity borrowing by A+ borrowers to 5% for longer 
maturity (4-5 year) loans in the higher risk bands. A 5% fee is also paid for secured lending 
with a title to assets. All property-related lending pays a 2% fee.  
Lenders can allocate their funds to individual businesses in one of two ways: 
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 Using the autobid tool, for chosen risk categories and lending maturities. This is similar to the 
approach used by Zopa for its consumer lending. The lender’s deposit is automatically 
allocated, across a large number of companies applying for funding. The lender chooses a 
maximum proportion of its lending (e.g. 1%) that will go to individual borrowers. 
 Making manual bids for loans on the Funding Circle marketplace (current borrowers looking for 
funding can be viewed via www.fundingcircle.com/lend/loan-requests/). This allows the 
lender to use her own judgement about which borrowers she wishes to fund. Loans are 
then activated when they attract sufficient funding (including any allocations from 
autobidding). 
Funding Circle’s annual balance sheet and income and expenditure accounts can be found via 
UK Companies House (company number 06968588, documents currently available via 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/). These reveal accounting losses of £1.1 million in 2011, 
£3.8 million in 2012, £4 million in 2013 and £10.8 million in 2014. These are relatively large in 
comparison to the amount of lending supported by the platform; for example the 2014 loss is 
around 4% of the average stock of lending supported on the platform during the course of that 
year. Section 4 discusses the significance of these continuing losses for the Funding Circle 
business model. 
Rate Setter (www.ratesetter.com) 
RateSetter was launched in October 2010. Like Zopa, it offers a ‘provision fund’ for bad debt 
(the 2013 launch of Zopa’s safeguard fund seems to be a response to RateSetter). This is funded 
out of the borrower’s credit fee and serves to reimburse lenders in the event of a late payment 
or default. 
As we have described in our discussion of Table 1 above, RateSetter is the only major UK P2P 
platform that lends to all three major categories of borrower – consumers, SMEs and lending 
secured on property. 
RateSetter also differs from other P2P lending companies in that it does not categorise 
borrowers by credit rating; instead it only accepts what it calls “prime” borrowers. Lending 
rates are then set based on the term of the loan rather than the credit rating of the borrower. 
RateSetter allows lenders either to invest at market rates (similar to Zopa or Funding Circle 
autobid) or to specify their minimum lending rates and the platform automatically allocates at 
the maximum rate that can be found above this minimum. The difference between these 
choices is that with a minimum rate, funds may remain uninvested (investing at market rate 
is effectively setting no minimum rate). 
We have been unable to find income and expenditure accounts for RateSetter via company 
house. The only accounting statements we found are balance sheets for RateSetter Trustee 
Services Ltd (company number 08090884), which uses the small companies exemption, which 
means it need not report an income and expenditure account. We have found press reports 
stating that RateSetter has announced an accounting profit of £0.6 million for the year ending 
31 March 2015 and was also profitable in the previous year, but no further information to 
substantiate these reports.  
3.2 The European Union 
We complete this section by making some brief comparisons of the UK with the development 
of P2P lending in other jurisdictions. Using data from (Wardrop et al., 2015), it is clear that the 
UK is the clear leader in the alternative finance market in the EU. For the year 2014, €2.9 billion 
was the size of the entire alternative finance market in the EU, but only €620 million was 
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outside the UK. Alternative finance as a whole, however, grew 144% in 2014 in the EU other 
than in the UK, compared with 2013. The UK is home to the highest number of alternative 
finance platforms, followed by Spain, France, the Netherlands and Germany.  
There are as yet no standard statistics for the development of European P2P lending. There is 
a European P2P Lending Finance Association, but from what we can see this has only a few 
members. It does appear, however, that interest in P2P lending is spreading rapidly across 
much of the European Union. One indicator of this is the index of P2P lending constructed by 
the website AltFi. According to this index, 2015 P2P loan volumes across continental Europe 
(other than the UK) amounted to some €674 million (Shoker, 2016). These figures seem to 
involve some underreporting, when compared to the data cited in Wardrop et al. (2015), but 
they suggest rapid growth of more than 100% per annum with many new platforms being 
established. 
3.3 The United States 
The United States along with the UK has been the pioneer in the development of P2P lending 
(although terminology is different, in the US it is described as ‘market place lending’). As we 
now discuss, there are several institutional and regulatory differences between P2P lending in 
the US and the UK.6 Compared to the UK, US P2P lending is much more focused on consumer 
credit.7 The US industry has evolved further away from the original concept of directly linking 
individual lenders and borrowers, becoming instead largely a mechanism for the sale of loans 
to institutional investors. Despite this rather different approach and orientation, US P2P or 
‘marketplace’ lending still represents, as it does in the UK, a relatively small share of total 
unsecured consumer lending. 
To mention some of the most prominent platforms in the US, the oldest and largest platforms 
Prosper and Lending Club were established to offer consumer lending and refinancing of 
student loans. Other well established platforms focusing on consumer lending are Avant 
(focusing on personal loans) and SoFi (specialising in refinancing of student loans). The 
leading providers of market place loans for small business are OnDeck, CAN Capital and 
Kabbage. GroundFloor and LendingHome provide short-term bridge mortgage finance.  
Figures for P2P lending have not been as conveniently available for the US as for the UK or 
EU. Morgan Stanley Research (2015) puts the level of marketplace lending (the usual term in 
the US for P2P lending) at $12 billion at the end of 2014. As in the UK, this was still only a very 
small fraction – 0.36% – of total US unsecured consumer lending of $3.3 trillion.8 This is fairly 
similar to the 2014 share of unsecured consumer lending taken by P2P lending platforms in 
the UK. A recent report from the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance finds a cumulative 
$25.7 billion at end 2015, suggesting the overall lending is somewhat greater than in the UK.9 
A difference from the UK is that US marketplace lending involves an even-greater share of 
investment from banks and institutional investors. For example, in 2015Q3, only 15% of the 
originations of Lending Club, the largest US marketplace lending platform, were financed by 
                                                     
6 US Treasury (2016) and Wardrop et al. (2016) provide an overview of US market place lending. 
7 Wardrop et al. (2016) report that the amount of consumer market place lending in the Americas 
(predominantly in the US) is about ten times the amount of small business market place lending, 
whereas the figures from  Zhang et al., (2016a) discussed above reveal that the amounts of P2P consumer 
lending and P2P SME lending in the UK are nearly the same. 
8 Figure taken from Frame (2015), who also provides a succinct overview of the development of 
marketplace lending in the US. 
9 See Wardrop et al. (2016). 
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individual investors, and 85% were taken by institutional investors such as banks, asset 
managers and hedge funds.10 US marketplace lenders are also much more associated with 
leveraged investment strategies than their UK counterparts – either because they themselves 
accept balance-sheet risk or because institutional investors use leverage to support their 
exposure to online loans.11 
Many of the US platforms have also developed partnerships with US banks.12 Marketplace 
lending is increasingly seen in the US not as competition to banks but rather as an opportunity, 
providing a new source of investment assets for banks with surplus funds, as an alternative 
way of financing loan assets for those in need of funds, and as a model for improved 
technology offering to both deposit and loan customers.  
Another distinguishing feature of US marketplace lending – not used to the same extent by 
UK P2P platforms – is its reliance on ‘big data analytics’, using sophisticated methods of data 
collection, from social media and other sources, and analysis in order to improve on standard 
US metrics of consumer-credit standing, such as the Fair-Isaacs FICO score.13 Many US 
marketplace lenders claim substantial improvements in understanding and pricing credit risk 
from these sophisticated methods. 
Despite its small market share and the increasing extent of partnerships between marketplace 
lending platforms and banks, the growth of marketplace lending has caused some concern 
amongst some banks in the US.14 This may in part be because the borrowers – both consumers 
and smaller businesses – are those who previously would have approached smaller US 
‘community’ banks for loans. So while the US banking industry as a whole is not yet greatly 
threatened by marketplace lending, some individual institutions are much more worried 
about potential loss of customers, prompting a lively discussion of the rise of marketplace 
lending in the US banking periodical The American Banker.  
The laws and regulations applied to P2P lending are of course different in the US than in the 
UK. One challenge is regulatory limits on consumer loan interest rates applicable in many 
states. To deal with these controls, US marketplace lenders work with partner banks, who 
formally grant loans once they are agreed on the P2P lending platform (for example Lending 
Club works with WebBank, a Utah-chartered financial institution) before selling them back to 
the platform investors. This practice, however, has been thrown into doubt by rulings on a 
case currently before the US Supreme Court and the industry awaits clarification of its legal 
position.15 
There has also been a somewhat greater concern in the US compared to the UK with the need 
for consumer and prudential regulation. The US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is 
increasingly involved in the oversight of marketplace consumer lending, including a well-
publicised enforcement action against Lending Club for lack of clarity on interest rates paid 
by one group of borrowers.16 The FDIC has stated that it wishes to keep a close watch on 
developments in marketplace lending, including potential risks to insured bank partnerships 
                                                     
10 Figure reported in Wack (2015b). 
11 See Wack (2015a). 
12 For a discussion of this trend see PWC (2015b) and Aranoff (2016). 
13 FICO is an acronym for the Fair Isaac Corporation, the creators of the FICO score. Wikipedia (2016) 
describes the construction of the FICO score. 
14 See for example the interviews reported in Kline (2015). 
15 See Wack (2016b). 
16 See Adler (2015) 
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with marketplace lenders. The US Treasury has conducted a ‘request for information’ in order 
to assess US regulatory policies. 
Another institutional difference between marketplace lending in the US and P2P lending in 
the UK is the well-established US practice of third-party servicing of bank loans. It is standard 
practice for US banks to outsource such servicing of the banks. This outsourcing plays an 
important role in the securitisation of US lending, allowing loans to be sold between 
institutions with no impact on the process of collection. This in turn means that there is a clear 
identification of servicing costs for platforms. As we suggest below, in section 4, achieving 
similarly clear identification of servicing costs may be a potential challenge for UK P2P 
lenders. 
We can complete this brief discussion of US marketplace lending with a closer look at the 
operations of Lending Club, the leading US marketplace lender, which went public through 
an IPO in December 2014. The post IPO stock price performance has disappointed investors, 
declining steadily from around $25 at the time Lending Club went public to less than $10 per 
share in early 2016. Being a public company, however, means that Lending Club puts a great 
deal of information about its performance into the public domain. 
In 2015, Lending Club originated $8.3 billion dollars of loans, nearly double the $4.3 billion 
originated in 2014. Of its total originations since Lending Club started operations, only 1.2% 
are business loans. Their lending is almost all consumer loans, with 68.5% used to refinance 
existing lending or credit cards (see https://www.lendingclub.com/info/statistics.action).  
A major difference between Lending Club and the P2P platforms operating in the UK is that 
all Lending Club investments consist of investments (called “member notes”) in individual 
loans with a minimum investment amount of £25. Thus, in order to diversify an investment 
across 100 different loans, it is necessary to invest $2,500 and hold 100 member notes. This is 
in sharp contrast to UK platforms such as Zopa where the automated lending allocates even 
the minimum investment of £10 across a large number of loans.  
Its operating revenues and operating costs, from the December 2015 10-K are reproduced in 
Table 3 below. As indicated, a large proportion of its revenues are transaction fees paid by 
borrowers when loans are originated. It also obtains servicing fees from investors, deducted 
from interest and loan repayments.  
Lending Club recorded a substantial net loss of $32.9 million in the year ending 31 December 
2014, amounting to around 0.4-0.5% of the stock of loans originated by Lending Club 
outstanding at end 2014. As can be seen from Table 3, Lending Club was in 2015 still pursuing 
an expansionary strategy with large expenditures on sales and marketing and engineering and 
product development, but transaction fees grew substantially and, as result, there was a much 
smaller loss of $5 million in the year ending 31 December 2015. 
The 2016Q1 results, announced on 9 May 2016, revealed a further growth in loan originations 
to $2.8 billion in the first quarter of 2016, an increase of 68% over the first quarter of 2015. The 
consequent growth of revenues enabled Lending Club to report its first quarterly profit of $4.1 
billion. This positive result, however, was overshadowed by the announcement in the first 
quarter results statement of the resignation of Rennaud Laplanche as Chairman and CEO:  
His resignation followed an internal review of sales of $22 million in near-prime loans 
to a single investor, in contravention of the investor's express instructions as to a non-
credit and non-pricing element, in March and April 2016 (Lending Club, 2016b). 
These financial statements highlight one concern about Lending Club and other 
marketplace lenders. The high levels of transaction fee revenues, relative to the servicing 
and origination costs, are an outcome of the high rates of growth of loans originated. As 
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their business matures and this growth slows, they will then have to engage in 
substantial cost reductions to remain profitable (indeed, they were only barely profitable 
in 2015, even with rapid rates of origination growth). Such cost reduction should be 
possible, as Lending Club has very high levels of sales, marketing and administrative 
costs relative to revenues suggesting considerable scope for cost reduction as the 
business matures. Still, the prospective long-run level of profitability, relative to the 
stock of originated loans, remains unclear and the volatility of their stock prices should 
not be viewed as in any way surprising. 
Table 3. Operating performance of Lending Club ($ ‘000) 
Years ended 31 December 2015 2014  2013 2012 
  (audited) (audited) (audited) (unaudited) 
Statement of Operations Data         
Transaction fees $ 373,508 $ 197,124 $ 85,830 $ 30,576 
Servicing fees 32,811 11,534 3,951 1,929 
Management fees 10,976 5,957 3,083 824 
Other revenue (expense) 9,402 (1,203) 5,111 716 
Total operating revenue 426,697 213,412 97,975 34,045 
Net interest income (expense)  
and fair value adjustments 
3,246 (2,284) 27 (238) 
Total net revenue 429,943 211,128 98,002 33,807 
Operating expenses:          
Sales and marketing 171,526 85,652 37,431 18,201 
Origination and servicing 61,335 37,326 17,978 7,589 
Engineering and product 
development 
77,062 38,518 15,528 4,855 
Other general and administrative 122,182 81,136 19,757 10,024 
Total operating expenses 432,105 242,632 90,694 40,669 
Income (loss) before income tax 
expense 
(2,162) (31,504) 7,308 (6,862) 
Income tax expense 2,833 1,390 — — 
Net income (loss) $ (4,995) $ (32,894) $ 7,308 $ (6,862) 
Source: Lending Club 10K 2015 (Lending Club, 2016a). 
 
In recent months there have been growing investor concerns about the ability of Lending Club 
and other US marketplace lenders to maintain the past rapid rate of growth in loan 
originations, which have supported their strong revenue growth. The rapid influx of 
institutional investment funds is leading to declining rates of interest on marketplace loans; 
this combined with an small rise in default rates is causing investors to have serious doubts 
about future growth.17 Still, given that market share still remains relatively small, rapid future 
growth is still possible.  
 
                                                     
17 Wack (2016a). 
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3.4 China 
We complete this section with a very brief discussion of P2P lending in China. We mention 
China at all only because P2P platform lending in China, mainly to small businesses, is 
reported to have nearly quadrupled to a staggering $150 billion in 2015, more than ten times 
the size of US marketplace lending originations.18 There are apparently more than 2,000 online 
P2P lending platforms in China.19 At the same time, however, there are substantial concerns 
about fraud, especially since the early 2016 failure of the platform Ezubo, which lost some $11 
billion of investors’ money.20 
Chinese P2P lending illustrates how differently online P2P lending can evolve in a distinct and 
relatively undeveloped regulatory and legal environment. The lending supported is very 
much riskier than in the US or the UK, with no fully developed system of credit referencing. 
Most Chinese P2P platforms are providing business loans financed out of investment by 
Chinese households. This is a response to the limited opportunities open to smaller businesses 
for borrowing from banks and the low returns offered to savers. The Chinese P2P platforms 
themselves vary considerably; many are not true P2P platforms without their own risk 
exposure, but rather take positions themselves or claim to offer guarantees to investors.21 
The Chinese regulatory authorities are now taking action to impose closer oversight of P2P 
lending. It remains to be seen how the sector develops, especially in the challenging situation 
of structural change in the Chinese economy towards growth that is less reliant on investment 
and exports than it has been in the past.  
3.5 Other countries 
The only other country for which we have found much reference to growth of P2P lending is 
Australia. We have not conducted a detailed review of Australian P2P lending platforms, 
although what has emerged from a brief review of online sources is that while at least eight 
P2P platforms are now licensed in Australia, including two – RateSetter and ThinCats – that 
also operate in the UK, the Australian market is still somewhat behind the level of 
development reached in the UK or the US. We have not investigated developments in other 
jurisdictions.  
4. An assessment of the business models and the economics 
of P2P lending 
This paper is completed with a critical discussion of the business models and economics of 
P2P lending, the prospects for its continuing growth and the risks and regulatory and 
economic policy issues resulting from the emergence of this new form of intermediation.  
A basic question running through the discussion of this section is why, before the emergence 
of P2P lending, was lending – especially to individuals and smaller companies unable to 
borrow on securities and money markets – provided by institutions (banks) offering a 
combination of credit, deposit and payment services. This section therefore begins with a 
                                                     
18 See Xinhua (2016). 
19 A useful overview of this market is provided by Williams-Grut (2015). A more detailed description is 
provided by Deer et al. (2015). 
20 See Wu (2016). 
21 See Deer et al. (2015). 
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discussion of the business models of conventional banking and the synergies that lead banks 
to combine these services.  
It then discusses to what extent the technologies that support P2P lending could potentially 
lead to an ‘unbundling’ of banking, separating credit provision and term deposits from 
payment services and the provision of liquidity. Finally, it discusses the risks of P2P lending, 
arguing that these can be addressed by promoting the greatest possible platform transparency, 
and priorities for regulation and public policy. 
4.1 The business models of conventional banking 
There are several explanations why banking services – deposits, payments and lending as well 
as a range of other financial services, such as off-balance sheet guarantees and securities 
trading – are provided together by banks and not to any substantial extent by other firms. In 
order to analyse the prospects that P2P lending will take away loan and deposit business from 
banks, it is first necessary to explain why banks have dominated the provision of loans, 
deposits and payment services and why these services are provided together and not 
independently. 
The perspective adopted here is that the critical defining feature of banks, which in turn leads 
them to jointly offer both deposit, payment and lending services, is the provision of liquidity 
to customers.22 Bank deposit customers have a right to draw deposits on demand, either by 
withdrawing cash or by using a bank payment instrument. Time deposits offer a future 
guarantee on repayment. Bank borrowers also value flexibility in their use of loan facilities, 
both in drawing down on loans when they are needed and repaying at a time of their choice 
in order to avoid unnecessary interest costs. Customers are willing to accept lower rates of 
return on deposits/higher costs of borrowing in return for these liquidity services; but there 
are economies of scale in liquidity provision.  
Uncertainty of these flows is reduced substantially at the bank portfolio level and even more 
so at the level of the whole economy. Banks can exploit these economies of scale, lowering 
their cost of funding and boosting their returns on lending by providing liquidity services on 
deposits and flexibility in loan contracts to a large pool of customers. They can obtain further 
economies of scale at industry level by borrowing and lending in money markets to manage 
temporary surpluses or shortages of liquidity. 
The provision of payment services is also closely associated with bank liquidity provision. It 
is possible for means of payment, including nowadays card payments and electronic credit 
transfers that are executed nearly instantaneously, to be provided via third parties (and some 
payment instruments e.g. credit cards indeed are quite often offered in this way), but 
technological economies of scale generally support the bundling of payment services into 
transaction deposit accounts. 
There are further economies of scale in credit risk assessment and loan portfolio management 
reinforcing the synergies of bank liquidity provision.23 In order to use their advantages in the 
                                                     
22 This same viewpoint can be found, amongst others, in Lewis (1992 and Kashyap et al. (2002). 
23 Much of the banking research literature focuses on the role of banks in overcoming information 
asymmetries in credit provision and other financial contracts, especially through the screening and 
monitoring of borrowers and the enforcement of loan contracts. According to this perspective, the 
employment of specialised technologies to overcome information asymmetries is the key feature that 
distinguishes banks from other firms, and not, as we argue, liquidity provision. This perspective on 
bank intermediation is emphasised, for example, in many textbooks and reviews of the literature, e.g. 
Bhattacharya & Thakor (1993). 
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supply of liquidity to offer flexible credit products, such as lines of credit (overdrafts), banks 
must also be expert in assessing a borrower’s creditworthiness, and therefore also have a 
competitive advantage in providing fixed-term loans. Bank provision of payment services, 
allowing observation of otherwise private customer cash flows, can also be an important part 
of the screening of bank borrowers and the monitoring of borrowers’ behaviour (although the 
costs of analysing payment flows to support credit assessment may only be worthwhile for 
larger borrowers). 
While the discussion here emphasises the liquidity provision as the core defining feature of 
banks, explaining why payments, deposit, lines of credit and fixed-term loans are provided 
together, other aspects of banking can also play an important role at least for some institutions 
and in some contexts. Another view of banking emphasises ‘banking relationships’, i.e. banks 
may have implicit commitments to support customers, perhaps rooted in connections through 
a local community or expectations of ongoing long-term commercial relationships. This may 
be important for some institutions (examples where such relationship banking still appears to 
play a substantial role are US community banks and German savings banks). Relationships 
also matter in providing banking services to larger corporations, both non-financial and 
financial. 
Discussion of competition to banks from P2P must also take account of specialised bank skills 
in managing particular assets – for example, the knowledge needed to extend loans to 
particular industrial sectors or particular categories of borrowers (screening), in monitoring 
borrower behaviour (when for example imposing loan covenants) and in managing exposure 
following default (through claiming collateral, pursuing legal redress or supporting borrower 
workout or repayment efforts). State supervision and support of banking – through detailed 
regulation, state-backed deposit insurance and the provision of the broader bank safety net – 
is also a potential further barrier to entry and may be a major determinant of banking market 
shares and pricing.  
This is not at all to deny the possibility that new technology may dramatically shift the 
‘boundaries’ of the bank. Despite the widespread adoption of computerised storage of banking 
records and introduction of a variety of electronic payment methods, many basic banking 
operations are still rooted in the previous era of paper-based transactions. The possibility to 
link deposit liabilities directly to specified loan assets, as is done in P2P lending platforms, was 
simply not available 15 or 20 years ago. It remains to be seen the extent to which the P2P 
business model and the associated level of transparency to support indirect (off balance sheet) 
lending become a standard part of the services offered by banks and offered by them to their 
own customers rather than by competing non-bank P2P platforms.  
4.2 The potential for P2P disintermediation of banking 
With this theoretical and conceptual background, we now consider the scope for P2P 
platforms capturing business from established banks. For such disintermediation to be truly 
‘peer-to-peer’, simultaneously taking both borrower and depositor business away from banks, 
there must both be sufficient benefits (in terms of pricing, improved customer service) to 
attract both borrowers and depositors and also a willingness on the part of these customers to 
forgo the liquidity services (flexibility in use of credit/withdrawal of deposits) provided by 
banks. 
The experience of P2P platforms from both the US and the UK shows that it has been much 
more difficult to persuade depositors, rather than borrowers, to participate on P2P platforms. 
Hence, these platforms have had to attract institutional investment in order to maintain 
platform growth. 
THE BUSINESS MODELS AND ECONOMICS OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING  21 
This is not so surprising. Many existing bank customers, both consumers and smaller firms, 
should be willing to agree fixed-term loans from P2P platforms in order to gain from 
comparatively low interest rates or simply to access otherwise unavailable credit. To persuade 
them to do so, these rates do not need to be much lower than what is on offer from banks. The 
main constraint is on the investor side. Lending on a P2P platform rather than making a bank 
deposit involves for personal customers the loss of deposit insurance protection and the need 
to acquaint themselves with an unfamiliar product. Despite the transparency of P2P platforms 
and their strong track record of recent performance, it is difficult for retail depositors to 
understand the risk involved and therefore to be comfortable about lending on P2P platforms. 
ISA (limited tax exempt status) in the UK will help attract new retail depositors, but it is 
difficult to believe that this will lead on its own to a transformative increase in retail lending 
via P2P platforms. 
As our analysis of the share of P2P of the total stock of lending in section 3 reveals, the process 
of capturing borrowers from banks has not proceeded very far to date, even in the US or the 
UK. Returns on offer, however, are very attractive and so continued institutional investment 
could support further growth of P2P lending at recent rapid rates (roughly doubling every 
year) for some time to come. In order for them to continue to commit funds to P2P platform 
lending, however, institutional investors are likely to want even greater transparency than is 
already offered by P2P platforms (see our discussion of P2P risks and standardisation below). 
Not the least of the reasons is the lack of consistency and comparability in credit assessment 
criteria across platforms, making it difficult to quantify risks over the business cycle, and also 
concerns about the impact of any platform failure.  
Suppose these challenges of risk-monitoring and risk assessment are overcome, can the 
development of P2P platforms then lead to the end of banking as we know it? Not at all, at 
least not if it is correct as suggested in this section that the core banking activity is liquidity 
provision rather than intermediation. The customers, both lenders and depositors, most easily 
attracted by the better rates on offer through P2P platforms, will be those customers with the 
least need for the liquidity services of banks. These are the customers who are already able to 
take advantage of the best rates on offer from banks, for term deposits or term loans, not the 
higher rates for lines of credit or instant access deposits. As we have already argued, banks 
themselves are also likely to seek to retain these customers through providing their own P2P 
platforms. The impact on bank net income will therefore be much smaller than the impact on 
bank assets (while assets will be reduced, bank return on assets will increase). 
Most P2P platforms do offer some liquidity services, for example Funding Circle in the UK 
allows its business customers to repay loans early, with their automated bidding re-investing 
funds in new loan applications. Most platforms, for example Zopa Classic, also allow investors 
to sell loans they hold for a fee. P2P platforms, however, are at a competitive disadvantage 
relative to banks in providing such liquidity services, as they do not have access to money 
market funding or to central bank liquidity. 
The impact of P2P lending should therefore be viewed as complementary to rather than 
competitive with bank offerings, taking off-balance sheet lending that would otherwise 
consume relatively large amounts of bank capital. Banks can therefore be expected, as is 
already happening in the US, to either set up their own P2P platforms or work with existing 
platforms, allowing them to market P2P borrowing to their existing customers as well as 
improving the availability of credit to some customers who do not easily qualify for 
conventional bank lending (as appears to have been the case in the UK in P2P lending to small 
businesses).  
In turn, the development of P2P appears to be a promising way of promoting the stability of 
banks and of the banking system as a whole, by providing additional loss-absorbing funding 
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for customer loans. This is of course provided that the institutional investment supporting P2P 
lending is long-term and from outside the banking system. Financial stability could instead be 
undermined by P2P lending if a large share of institutional investment came from domestic or 
international banks investing in illiquid P2P loan portfolios re-financing their positions using 
short-term money market borrowing. Funding of P2P lending in this manner would parallel 
the unstable short-term repo and ABCP money market funding of subprime mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and other US dollar-structured credit securities held by US and international 
banks that triggered the global financial crisis of 2007-08 (although that experience should 
make both banks and regulators alert to the dangers of employing maturity mismatch to invest 
in P2P loans).  
4.3 Platform transparency and the risks of P2P intermediation 
In this sub-section we note a number of potential risks to which we believe the industry will 
need to pay greater attention in the future and argue, further, that industry standardisation 
provides the most effective response to these risks. 
The risks we have in mind are the following: 
1. The industry already provides high levels of disclosure on historical loan default and 
projections of future performance. These are in many cases accompanied by loan loss 
reserve funds – such as those provided by Zopa and RateSetter in the UK – to offer lenders 
compensation for default. This work, however, has largely focused on expected default 
and as yet does not provide much quantification of the critical dimensions of variability of 
default or of loan loss recovery.24 With regard to variability of default, diversification across 
a large number of borrowers already provides lenders with substantial protection against 
expected levels of default and loss. What remains unprotected, even with diversification, 
is the variability of default and loss over the business cycle – losses can jump substantially 
in a major economic downturn and could easily exhaust a default fund based on offering 
protection up to the average annual level of defaults. The industry has a lot still to do to 
quantify the risks of loss in a business downturn and to educate investors about these risks. 
2. There are similar challenges in developing greater levels of transparency and best practice 
operational processes in relation to recovery of lost loans. One problem – which may be a 
particular concern for lending secured on property – is that recovery levels depend to an 
important degree on the role of lenders in contract enforcement, to obtain maximum 
recovery in the event of loan default through exercising claims on security or reaching 
agreement with borrowers on loan rescheduling. Banks have specialised units to carry out 
such tasks, but it remains unclear how much activity of this kind will be carried out by P2P 
lenders to minimise post-default loan losses. Most P2P platforms will emphasise that they 
have very high standards of credit assessment and that they lend only to high-quality 
borrowers where anticipated default rates are extremely low, so this is not a significant 
issue. But achieving the full potential future growth of the industry will require extending 
lending to higher-risk borrowers, especially if P2P lending is to provide credit to borrowers 
who have been refused bank credit, so this is still a key issue to be addressed in the future. 
3. The industry also needs to openly confront the risks of platform failure, either bankruptcy 
following large financial losses or the possibility of operational failure. As we have 
discussed in section 3, a number of the largest P2P platforms, including Zopa, First Circle 
and Lending Club, are loss-making. Much of these losses can be attributed to the needs of 
                                                     
24 These are basic concepts of credit risk, discussed in standard textbooks such as Servigny & Renault 
(2004) and Bouteille & Coogan (2013). 
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system development and of the active marketing of their services to new customers, but 
still it is clear that platform viability depends on achieving sufficient scale to cover the fixed 
costs of operation. As the industry matures, it can be expected that a number of platforms 
will fail to achieve sufficient scale and be forced to close. This raises the question of what 
happens to the lending on a discontinued platform, which should be answered before such 
an eventuality transpires with potentially damaging consequences for P2P platforms that 
remain. 
4. Investors also need to be aware of the possibility of falling P2P loan prices resulting from 
a self-reinforcing withdrawal of funds by institutional investors subject to ‘mark-to-
market’ valuation of their P2P investments. One attraction of P2P loans to institutional 
investors, and a factor behind the substantial increase in institutional lending on US P2P 
platforms, is the possibility of readjusting their exposure by selling loans to other investors. 
However, this liquidity -- while useful for individual investors -- may not always be 
reliably available. A decline in the returns anticipated on P2P lending – triggered for 
example by a rise in default rates -- or simply a desire to readjust investment portfolios 
and shift them into safer assets because of some economic shock unrelated to P2P lending, 
could cause investors to seek to liquidate their exposures and lead to a sharp rise of P2P 
rates and decline of P2P loan valuations. With mark-to-market valuation, especially if some 
investments are highly leveraged or subject to binding short-term portfolio performance 
metrics, this could in turn trigger further sales and price falls. Over time, such instability 
should decline, as investors become more familiar with this new asset class and less 
constrained market participants become willing to commit capital to stabilise prices during 
episodes of price volatility. But until the market matures in this way, investors should 
expect episodes of relatively large price instability. 
5. Finally there are the ever-present dangers of fraud, cybercrime and operational outages 
(although we do not claim any particular expertise on these issues). 
An effective means of addressing all of these risks is industry standardisation. The UK Peer-
to-Peer Financing Association is already playing a leading role in promoting transparency and 
data standards.25 But more can be done. 
Agreed standardised metrics of various loan characteristics, such as borrower credit standing, 
industry and purpose of loan are needed to allow the migration of loan contracts from one 
platform to another, for the development of comparable risk measures and for allowing risk 
to be assessed using combined data from many platforms. Such metrics can also help support 
the timely determination of losses on defaulted loans, either through outright sale or through 
management of recovery of retained loans using collection agencies.  
Platforms also need to offer much greater transparency about their own operational and 
financial performance. In the case of the UK, we have had to rely for our research on the very 
limited statutory disclosures made through Companies House. Even the SEC submissions of 
the publicly listed P2P platform Lending Club provides only limited insight into the costs and 
revenues of their business model. As we have noted, Zopa, Funding Circle and Lending Club 
have all reported substantial losses over the past two years. While we have no reason to doubt 
their long-term viability, they simply do not provide sufficient publication information to 
work out their ongoing costs such as loan servicing and distinguish these from expenditure 
devoted to the development of their customer base and operational systems. 
We note that with respect to operational oversight the US P2P industry has one substantive 
advantage over that in the UK, with the routine of loan servicing (such as collection of 
                                                     
25 See Peer-to-Peer Finance Association (2015b and 2016a). 
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payments) often outsourced to operational specialists. This provides benchmarking of 
servicing costs for the entire industry. We see benefits for the UK P2P industry of the 
development of similar outsourcing arrangements, which could be used by both banks and 
non-banks to provide and facilitate the sale of loans amongst investors and their transfer across 
platforms. 
Greater standardisation, both the ability to transfer loans from one platform to another and 
full business transparency, will challenge P2P platforms. The pertinent question is what 
ultimately is their competitive advantage? Will they themselves become commoditised low-
return utilities through standardisation of their credit assessment and operational processes? 
As a result, individual P2P platforms may be reluctant to adopt industry standards, because 
of the fear of losing control over their own ‘secret sauce’.  
Our view is that individual platforms need to accept and not resist standardisation. The key 
distinguishing feature of P2P lenders is not the platform they operate, but rather the interface 
they provide to that platform, any distinguishing features of their customer base (not just type 
of borrower, but also for example social or community orientation that may affect loan 
performance and characteristics) and the different services they offer their customers for 
portfolio allocation and risk assessment and management. Standardisation at industry level is 
critical to the long-term growth and stability of the P2P industry and therefore is in the 
interests of the leading industry participants.  
4.4 Regulation and public policy 
We complete our analysis with a brief discussion of regulatory and public policy issues in P2P 
lending, distinguishing i) operational risk and customer protection, ii) prudential safety and 
systemic risk and iii) the promotion of competition and efficiency in credit markets. We argue 
that industry-wide standardisation is key to achieving these regulatory goals and should 
therefore also be a priority for regulatory oversight of P2P lending. 
We have summarised the key sources of risk in P2P lending in the previous sub-section. 
Regulators in the US, the UK and in other jurisdictions are now looking carefully at this newly 
emerging form of financial intermediation.26 The stated objective of both US and UK regulators 
is to ensure appropriate oversight without blocking financial innovation and the use of P2P 
platforms to provide credit to borrowers who are unable to borrow from banks. 
An issue for regulators is prioritisation – they cannot address all regulatory concerns over P2P 
lending at once. The immediate priority in regulatory oversight is appropriately on 
operational risks and customer protection. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK, 
for example, has paid close attention to the segregation of client money. There are, however, 
many other operational issues. We have already discussed orderly platform closure (UK 
regulators now require all P2P platforms to have plans for orderly resolution) and the 
management of arrears and default. Another is appropriate communication of risks to retail 
investors.  
From a prudential perspective, P2P platforms, provided they are operationally sound, should 
pose much lesser prudential risks than traditional banks. Lenders on these platforms absorb 
loan losses directly and the loan losses pose no threat to the viability of the platform. Moreover, 
as we have documented, the market for P2P lending is still a long way from posing substantial 
systemic financial risks. Nevertheless, regulators should pay close attention to prudential and 
systemic risks. We emphasise the following three points, which do not yet seem particularly 
prominent in regulatory thinking:  
                                                     
26 See US Treasury (2015), Financial Conduct Authority (n.d.) and Financial Conduct Authority (2016).  
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i) Prudential safety can be promoted by ensuring that there are no barriers to the possibility 
of banks reducing their risk exposures by putting their own loan books on P2P platforms 
(whether run by themselves or by a third party) and that banks receive appropriate 
reduction in capital requirements for such transfers (allowing for any differences in credit 
quality between transferred and retained loans).  
ii) The most likely source of systemic risk in P2P platforms is from liquidity – not credit risks 
– in particular the possibility discussed above of withdrawal of investor funds leading to 
a self-reinforcing collapse of prices. Regulators will have to pay careful attention, however, 
if the growth of P2P institutional investment continues, to ensure this does not replicate 
the same kind of systemic risks that materialised in the global financial crisis of 2007-08, 
for example if banks were to using short-term money market funding to invest in the P2P 
loans originated by other institutions.  
iii) Close attention is warranted to the role of P2P lending in property markets, and the 
possibility that they could exacerbate systemic risk in both commercial property and buy-
to-let residential property (we find it somewhat surprising that P2P property lending 
qualifies for the new ISA tax exemption status, introduced in the UK from April 2016).  
Finally, as regulators are already doing, proper attention should be paid to achieving the 
potential for P2P lending by overcoming barriers to access to credit. In this respect, the initial 
experience in the UK, in which P2P lending is providing a substantial share now exceeding 
13% of new lending to small businesses, is encouraging. This aspect of P2P lending in the UK 
seems to us to argue for particular attention being paid to the P2P lending elsewhere in the 
European Union, where the promotion of small-business lending is a stated priority of the 
effort to promote “capital markets union”.  
We believe that all these tasks will be helped by the greatest possible degree of standardisation 
of loan conditions and credit and performance metrics. The argument is much the same as 
already made in relation to platform transparency and P2P platform risks. The greatest 
possible degree of standardisation will help limit operational risks, promote customer 
protection and enhance prudential safety (especially through allowing the fullest possible 
participation including participation by banks in P2P platforms).27 Pursued at the EU level, 
standardisation of P2P business processes appears to be particularly promising for supporting 
capital markets union and allowing flows of investment capital across national borders to 
where they can be most efficiently employed.28 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This paper has reviewed peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, its development in the UK and other 
countries, and assessed the business and economic policy issues surrounding this new form 
of intermediation. 
Section 2 describes P2P lending. This employs similar information technologies to those that 
have supported other internet-based commerce, in order to allow direct investment in 
consumer and small business loans, both by individuals and institutional investors. The 
                                                     
27 We note in the UK the related initiative (HM Treasury, 2014) to develop standardised APIs 
(application programming interfaces) for SME data so that transaction information can be shared by all 
potential lenders, and not only the bank providing a business with payment and bank account services. 
This standardisation could be a further support for the growth of P2P lending. 
28 See Milne (2015) for a more general discussion about the importance of financial technology and the 
setting of financial standards at European level for achieving European policy objectives. 
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technology allows diversification over a large number of borrowers without the loans having 
to be held on an intermediary balance sheet. These platforms can also allow the interest rates 
on loans to be determined by competition between lenders and for lenders to realise their 
investments by selling their loans (with a charge) to other lenders on the platform (although 
for retail investors a much simpler interface with automatic allocation of investments to 
different borrowers is usually employed). These liquidity and price-setting features, together 
with the large scale of funding from institutional investors, have led to the use in the US of the 
term ‘marketplace lending’ rather than ‘peer-to-peer’ lending to describe these platforms. 
Section 3 reviews development in the UK and other countries. P2P lending has developed 
rapidly in both the US and the UK, more than doubling annually for several years, but from a 
very small base. Even today, it represents a small fraction, less than 1%, of total bank lending. 
In most other countries, development of P2P lending is behind even that of the US and the 
UK.29 In the UK, however, P2P lending has become an important source of loans for smaller 
companies, amounting to 13% of new conventional bank loans to firms with turnover of less 
than £1-£2 million per year (but it does not appear to have achieved the same importance in 
small-company finance in any other jurisdictions). 2015 data suggest that P2P lending 
captured a rather smaller share (around 1.4%) of the gross flow of unsecured lending in the 
UK and appears to be at around a similar proportion in the US. 
P2P or marketplace lending has developed along a slightly different path in the US compared 
to the UK, with a much greater emphasis on consumer finance and an even greater 
involvement of institutional investment funds. We also observe the emergence of greater 
cooperation between banks and P2P platforms in the US, although this is a development that 
may follow in time also in the UK. 
Section 4 has argued that P2P lending is fundamentally complementary to, and not 
competitive with conventional banking. This argument is based on our view that the 
fundamental core of most bank business models is the provision of liquidity services. 
Synergies in liquidity explain the co-existence of loan, deposit and payment services in banks. 
We therefore expect banks to adapt to the emergence of P2P lending, either by cooperating 
closely with third-party P2P lending platforms or offering their own proprietary platforms to 
serve their existing customers. We also argue that while there is scope eventually for a 
substantial proportion of lending to be provided through P2P platforms, and this could lead 
to large gains, both private and social, especially through widening access to credit for 
example by smaller companies, the full development of the sector requires further work 
addressing the challenge of risk management and risk communication, and a cooperative 
industry-wide approach to addressing the various business and regulatory issues in P2P 
lending.  
We have highlighted five areas of risk to the future development of P2P lending: i) adequate 
development and communication of risk measures, especially the possibility of substantial 
increase of default in a major business downturn; ii) the related problem of enforcement of 
contracts following loan default and ensuring maximum possible loan loss recovery; iii) the 
need to deal with potential platform failures without losses to lenders; iv) potential liquidity 
risks, especially from involvement of institutional investors subject to ‘mark to market’ 
                                                     
29 With the exception of China where, as a result of the structural limitations of established banks, a 
variety of forms of non-bank lending using the Internet have grown at an extraordinary pace over the 
past few years; but the business models of these non-bank lenders varies considerably and is often very 
different from P2P lending in other jurisdictions. For this reason China’s experience is not really 
comparable with that of the US and the UK. 
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valuations who are unable to absorb short-term losses; and v) fraud, cryptographic security 
and operational risks. 
We argue that much greater standardisation of loan, credit performance and operational 
metrics will be key to addressing these risks and supporting the fullest development of P2P 
lending. Cooperation on the further development of business and technical standards for the 
industry should therefore be a priority for both industry participants and regulators. While 
such standardisation could be pursued on a national level, the challenge arises in many 
countries and so where possible it may be better to set standards at EU or other supranational 
level. 
To conclude, we suggest a 20%:80% rule of thumb applies to the prospects of P2P lending, 
much as it does in other applications of financial technology. That is to say, the future of P2P 
lending will be determined only to a relatively minor degree (20%) by technological 
developments and will depend to a much greater extent (80%) on successfully developing 
reliable business processes, standardisation and appropriate regulation that serves the needs 
of customers. 
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